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Introduction
‘The history of the Zulu people is the history of myself’.1 In Africa,
as elsewhere, the notion of tradition is bound up with the discourses
of ethnicity and nationalism. Typically invoking pre-colonial identi-
ties as the basis of peoplehood, such narratives of common descent
are imbued with a strong sense of ‘pastness’, orientating the modern
self in traditional terms. Anderson explains this invocation of tradi-
tion as a feature of the inverted nature of ethnic narratives of common
descent.2 More common are accounts which focus on the ‘loss of
meaning’ brought about by modernisation and the psychic security
offered by an idealised past. Recent theories look to supplant this
sense of tradition as reaction with a sense of tradition as creation. One
example is Lonsdale’s argument that the affirmation of ethnicity in
post-colonial Africa, with its associated invention of tradition, must
be seen in the context of internal debates over civic virtue as pre-colo-
nial moral economies are re-structured by the state and capitalism.3
If, for whatever reason, the appeal to tradition is central to ethnic
and nationalist discourses in Africa, it is an appeal set in opposition to
‘the modern’. A legacy of late-nineteenth century European colonial
discourse, ‘civilisation’ with its Christian moral being and ‘enlight-
ening’ education, was contrasted with a ‘primitive’, ‘barbaric’ and
‘warlike’ tribal other. Ironically reproduced by the assimilationist
African élite, strands of this opposition continue to flavour political
discourse to this day. In fact, the mediation of this tension between the
modern and the traditional, the European and African, the future and
the past has formed a central theme in African identity politics this
century.4 A contemporary example is KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Tra-
ditional Affairs Inkosi Nyanga Ngubane’s recent defence of the local
authority of amakosi (chiefs) (Natal Witness 22/10/94).
Long a target of enlightenment rationalism, tradition was cast as
an apologist for arbitrary and oppressive authority. Further, as the
modern world has become increasingly organised along rationalist
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lines, ‘magic and mystery’ have been lost: as Weber puts it, the mod-
ern world is a ‘dis-enchanted’ one. If so, this suggests that tradition,
and perhaps with it ethnicity, is ultimately doomed. Recent develop-
ments in social theory call this assumption into question, however.
The rise of ‘postmodern’ theories concerned with a ‘postmodern con-
dition’ criticise reason rather than tradition. Reason has been exposed
as unavoidably entangled in history, society, power, practice and
interest, body and desire; its claims to be the sole legitimate source of
truth and author of action have been revealed as artificial, and its vic-
tims in the ‘war for liberation’ have been unfairly subordinated,
repressed and dominated. Further, as Zygmunt Bauman puts it, post-
modernism is concerned to ‘re-enchant’ the world modernity tried to
‘dis-enchant’ (1992:x). Will tradition be re-affirmed in this return of
the repressed?
In answering this question, this paper (i) recounts the original
defence of tradition by the English traditionalists Burke and
Oakeshott. This defence is then considered in relation to (ii) the
philosophical treatment of tradition offered by Gadamer, and (iii)
the sociological approach of Giddens. On this basis it is argued that
tradition remains a legitimate, if weakened, source of authority in an
increasingly ‘post-traditional’ world. This ambiguous re-claiming
leaves ethnic and nationalist discourses awkwardly – sometimes
ominously – poised.
I
Our reason must be considered as a kind of cause, 
of which truth is the natural effect …
David Hume
[Tradition] appears to me to be the result of profound reflection; 
or rather the happy effect of following nature, which is wisdom 
without reflection, and above it.
Edmund Burke
In 1793 Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet,
under threat of death by the Jacobins, went into hiding to write his
Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progres de l’esprit humain. Pub-
lished posthumously in 1795, the Esquisse was hailed as a testament
of the French Enlightenment and was adopted as the philosophical
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manifesto of the post-Thermidorian reconstruction. In less than two
hundred pages Condorcet covers nine epochs of human history, cul-
minating with a euphoric description of the tenth epoch: ‘The Future
Progress of the Human Mind’. Progress for Condorcet does not sim-
ply mean development, but progress towards the perfection of the
human species. The hero of his narrative is Reason which, triumphing
over the devious tactics of priests, tyrants, despots and cunning hyp-
ocrites, gains an overwhelming momentum. The endpoint of the logic
of Reason is nothing other than the full realisation of justice, virtue,
freedom, and happiness for the human race, the liberation of human-
kind from arbitrary power, superstition and tradition.
Although perhaps the zenith of Enlightenment hyperbole, Con-
dorcet’s testament is clearly rooted in a Rationalist discourse that
stretches from Descartes to modern times; a discourse that, although
diverse, shares a common rejection of tradition as the source of truth
about the world, reserving this role for reason alone. As early as 1637,
one hundred and fifty years before Condorcet’s Esquisse, Rene
Descartes had drawn this opposition. Observing in the Discourse on
Method that ‘the ground of our opinion is far more custom and exam-
ple than any certain knowledge’, and that ‘absurd and incredible’
beliefs were widely received by ‘common consent’, he resolved
‘never to allow ourselves to be persuaded of the truth of anything
unless on the evidence of our reason’. This antinomy between the
misrepresentations of ‘custom and example’, the ‘truths’ of tradition,
and the genuine enlightenment provided by individualist reason,
echoes the description of the ‘modern rationalist’ that Michael
Oakeshott offers 300 years later:
At bottom he [the modern rationalist] stands (he always stands) for inde-
pendence of mind on all occasions, for thought free from obligation to any
authority save the authority of ‘reason’. His circumstances in the modern
world have made him contentious: he is the enemy of authority, of preju-
dice, of the merely traditional, customary or habitual. His mental attitude
is at once skeptical and optimistic: skeptical, because there is no opinion,
no habit, no belief, nothing so firmly rooted or so widely held that he hes-
itates to question it and to judge it by what he calls his ‘reason’; optimistic
because the Rationalist never doubts the power of his ‘reason’ (when
properly applied) to determine the worth of a thing, the truth of an opin-
ion or the propriety of an action. (Oakeshott 1962:1-2)
The rationalist attack did not go undefended. The French Revolu-
tion prompted a furious debate between Condorcet and company on
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the one hand, and defenders of tradition such as Edmund Burke, on
the other. Burke argued that tradition embodied the practical experi-
ence of generations, moral, spiritual and political which mirrored the
workings of nature. Reason had a role, but only in a framework of
ends and means derived from tradition (and therefore from the aris-
tocracy). The doctrine of the ‘revolutionary society’ is, Burke claims,
a ‘barbarous philosophy, which is the offspring of cold hearts and
muddy understanding … void of all solid wisdom, as it is destitute of
all taste and elegance’ (Butler 1984:45). Despite his caveat on the role
of reason, Burke repeats the Enlightenment opposition between tra-
dition and reason as mutually exclusive paths to truth. That noted, he
does identify the two key concerns of traditionalists: the demise of
practical knowledge and the relationship between tradition and
authority. These issues are central to Oakeshott’s more sophisticated
defence of tradition nearly two centuries later. 
Oakeshott argues that rationalism has appropriated reason in a one-
sided manner. Enamoured with reason and method, rationalism mis-
takes technical knowledge for knowledge as a whole. What this
misconception misses, he argues, is practical knowledge – that ele-
ment of truth which is ‘imparted and acquired’; can be learnt only by
‘apprenticeship to the master’; that knowledge which, accumulated
over generations, becomes encoded in tradition. Following Pascal,
Oakeshott argues that this philosophical mistake is mirrored at the
level of practical action by the belief that certain knowledge contains
more truth than probable knowledge. This belief rests on an exagger-
ated conception of the importance of rational method or technical
proficiency, thus limiting the insight of reason. The practical advan-
tage of tradition, Oakeshott insists, is that it contains more of the
whole truth than the partiality of rational method can ascertain. What
is required, he concludes, is the mutual co-existence of reason and tra-
dition in such a manner that the limits of technical reason are
acknowledged, and hence the claims of authority recognised. Thus
while echoing Burke’s concern with the demise of practical reason,
Oakeshott attempts to avoid the polarisation of reason and tradition as
mutually exclusive paths to truth.
The outcome of the confrontation between the rationalists and tra-
ditionalists is well known. Weber saw ‘occidental’ rationalism ‘dis-
enchanting’ Europe of religious world-views, ushering in a secular
culture, and permeating and defining the operation of key institutions
(Habermas 1985:1). However more recent developments suggest that
the victory of reason over tradition must be re-evaluated. Central here
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is the widespread sense of social change as the twentieth century
draws to a close – a condition often termed ‘postmodern’. Richard
Bernstein characterises this Stimmung5 as one which affirms incom-
mensurability, otherness, alterity, difference and plurality against the
claims of a universal, totalising reason. In fact, much of twentieth
century philosophy is concerned with debunking the enlightenment
legacy’s account of reason, a tendency Bernstein labels the ‘rage
against reason’. There are two aspects to this. On the one hand, the
twentieth century has witnessed the dark side of the promise of rea-
son: totalitarianism, genocide, death-camps, the threat of nuclear
holocaust and environmental destruction. On the other, there has been
a corresponding discontentment with established political and philo-
sophical discourses. As Thomas McCarthy puts it:
The overwhelming ‘impurity’ of reason, its unavoidable entanglement in
history and tradition, society and power, practice and interest, body and
desire, has prompted, amongst others, Nietzsche’s heroic proclamation of
the end of philosophy, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic farewell, and Heideg-
ger’s dramatic overcoming. (in Habermas 1985:vii)
In the light of the problematisation of Enlightenment reason, the
defence of tradition as represented by Burke and Oakeshott deserves
reappraisal. Whilst the force of their arguments is a matter of some
dispute, the debate might be clarified by engaging with more recent
attempts at rehabilitating tradition, notably the work of Hans-Georg
Gadamer and Anthony Giddens.
II
Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-
examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the
family, society and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity 
is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is 
only a flicker in the closed circuits of historical life.
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Gadamer’s work has an intimate relationship with the current empha-
sis on the limits of philosophy and with the question of tradition. In
Truth and Method, Gadamer develops a philosophical account of
hermeneutical understanding which criticises the Enlightenment
belief in scientific method as the sole way to ‘objective’ truth. Central
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to this critique is the rehabilitation of ‘prejudice’ and tradition, as well
as an emphasis on the importance of phronesis to the process of
understanding. As well as sharing these Oakeshottian themes,
Gadamer appears, at times, to echo the widespread ‘traditionalist’
commitment to authority.6 There are, however, crucial differences
between Gadamer and even the most sophisticated ‘traditionalist’
views. These differences exist both at the philosophical level in
Gadamer’s account of the nature of truth-claims, as well as the polit-
ical level in the relationship between tradition and authority. The
upshot of these differences is that Gadamer comes to articulate an
understanding of tradition markedly different from the traditionalist
versions.
Philosophically, Gadamer’s account emerges from a critique of
positivism which emphasises the necessary role of prejudice and
authority in the process of truth-redemption. There are three steps to
this claim: First is Gadamer’s adaptation of Husserl’s claim that the
understanding of an object is the understanding of that object as
something. This means all understanding involves projecting meaning
in perceiving that is not strictly contained in the perceptions them-
selves. Such projection is not subsequent to the experience of sense-
perception but immediate and intuitive. This phenomenological point
means that the content of a perception is always ‘prejudiced’ as it nec-
essarily involves a point of view of some sort. Gadamer’s draws on
the conception of the hermeneutic circle in developing an under-
standing of the nature of such ‘prejudice’. Dilthey, for example,
argued that understanding a text always involved a projection of its
meaning on the basis of a partial experience of it. Of course such a
projection might well be re-evaluated in the light of subsequent read-
ing. Thus Gadamer argues against the enlightenment that prejudice
here literally means ‘prejudgement’ – something that is temporary,
and can be confirmed or denied by further reading. To assume that all
prejudices are misleading, as the Enlightenment does, is simply a
‘prejudice against prejudices’.
Second, Gadamer draws on Heidegger in arguing that all interpre-
tive projections of meaning are rooted in the situation of the inter-
preter. Heidegger terms this situated determination of meaning the
fore-structure of understanding. More precisely this means that before
one has begun to consciously interpret a text, one has already placed
it in a certain context (Vorhabe), approached it from a certain per-
spective (Vorsicht), and conceived of it in a certain way (Vorgriff).
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The meaning of any object then is ‘co-determined’ by one’s own life
circumstances, or ‘life-relations’, by one’s ‘thrownness’ in Dasein.
Third, whilst Heidegger locates understanding in the concerns of
the interpreting subject, Gadamer emphasises the historical dimen-
sion of this structure of involvements. This means that the issues that
one brings to the process of interpretation are not one’s preoccupa-
tions alone, but refer to the issues and concerns within the historical
tradition to which one belongs. Thus the situation of ‘thrownness’ is
not itself unconditioned or arbitrary, but rather stems from the tradi-
tion in which we are rooted. Consequently, even the shock quality of
contemporary art is orientated by the tradition from which it deviates.
This means that a statement about the meaning of a work of art is not
an individual statement, but rather one that reflects one’s inheritance.
At work here is what Gadamer terms ‘effective history’, the ‘opera-
tive force’ of tradition over those who belong to it.
Thus against the Enlightenment Gadamer argues that our idea of
reason is itself grounded in a tradition and, in this sense, the opposi-
tion of reason and tradition makes no sense. Rather, understanding
involves either immediate insight into the ‘truth-claim’ advanced (an
understanding of die Sache), or an act of interpretation which reveals
the ‘truth-claim’ of the object apparent. Understanding reached
through interpretation is hermeneutical, and involves what Gadamer
terms the ‘fusion of horizons’, where the ‘truth-claim’ of the ‘other’,
situated in a horizon of historical meanings, meshes with the horizon
of meanings of the interpreter. This involves a process of reasoned
dialogue in an attitude of mutual openness so as to come to agreement
and hence an understanding about a truth-claim.
Whilst concurring with the traditionalists that reason is not the sole
method to truth, Gadamer differs clearly from Burke’s claim that rea-
son has no fundamental role in truth-redemption. In describing the
hermeneutic process as a ‘dialogue’ in which one is open to the ‘oth-
erness of the other’, reason clearly has a role. This appears to move
Gadamer closer to Oakeshott’s claim that practical reason, or phrone-
sis, transmitted through tradition, is what is required for truth-
redemption. Indeed, Oakeshott favourably quotes Pascal’s argument
that rationalism rests on a false criterion of certainty, whereas prac-
tical knowledge, moving from a basis of probability rather than
certainty, ‘has more of the whole truth than certain knowledge’. How-
ever, it seems to me that Gadamer understands the nature of phrone-
sis not so much as actual truth-claims verified by experience and
encoded in a tradition, but rather as the skilful handling of the process
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of attaining such truth-claims out of the mediation of the horizons of
meaning of partners in dialogue.
This argument rests on Gadamer’s conception of the process of
truth-redemption, which follows three steps. First, is the assumption
in favour of the truth-claim of one’s partner in dialogue. This assump-
tion is made so as to prevent the truth-claim which emerges from the
hermeneutic process simply being the function of one’s own preju-
dices. By assuming the truth of claims made by one’s partner in dia-
logue, and so opening one’s prejudices to reflection and doubt, the
emergent claim cannot simply be ‘subjectivist’. This argument draws
on Dilthey’s and Schleiermacher’s accounts of the hermeneutic circle,
but the guiding assumption is not one of coherence, but one in favour
of the truth-claim of a text. Thus if an interpretation of a text along the
lines of the hermeneutic circle makes the text take a position that
appears obviously false, this indicates the possible inadequacy of the
interpretation. What is required is an openness to the otherness or the
distinctness of the text, a privileging of the text as having a certain
normative authority.
However, this caveat of openness seems merely to replace one’s
initial assumptions with the claims made by one’s partner in dialogue.
Is one not simply replacing certain unexamined prejudices with other
views explicitly taken from tradition? At this point Gadamer intro-
duces his second point: the ‘applicative moment’. The views of tradi-
tion are never simply adopted, he holds, but modified in relation to
one’s concerns and historical circumstance. Quoting Aristotle’s criti-
cism of Plato’s account of ethical knowledge, Gadamer argues that
meaning is only realisable when related to particular concrete cir-
cumstances. Like ethical knowledge, he argues, the demands of the
particular are the grounds of possible meaning. Our particular con-
cerns and prejudices shape the line of questioning in the hermeneutic
process, and hence the answers (and meaning) that are given. This
argument appears to answer the charge that hermeneutic understand-
ing seems to involve an acquiescence to the authority of tradition. We
do not simply adopt the view of tradition; rather, the way we under-
stand its truth already involves application to our situation. Thus
against Oakeshott, Gadamer sees phronesis as the procedural skill of
mediating the universal with the particular, as opposed to established
fore-knowledge of the particular.
There is however, a crucial ambivalence in how Gadamer articu-
lates the significance of the ‘understanding’ reached in the hermeneu-
tic process. In more conservative moments, Gadamer appears to take
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‘understanding’ as the ‘fusion of horizons’ where the truth-claim of
object and interpreter are necessarily intertwined into a new, different
truth-claim. This more Hegelian moment has the consequence of
always orientating the interpreter to attaching an ongoing normative
status to tradition, rather than a temporary one. But as Warnke argues,
why should one always orientate oneself to coming to an agreement
with tradition? Why should we not define our opinions in opposition
to tradition? Consider the case of interpreting Mein Kampf for exam-
ple. Rather, following Warnke, it seem appropriate to read Gadamer’s
‘fusion of horizons’ as involving coming to an agreement about the
meaning of a truth-claim, rather than accepting the claim as valid for
oneself (Warnke 1987:134-138).
This conclusion is important as it distances Gadamer’s account
from traditionalist defences of authority. This is most importantly
expressed in the meaning ultimately ascribed to the notion of tradi-
tion: no longer a privileged access to truth, it becomes more the social
origin of our prejudices; the discourses, social practices, symbolic
order in which we are located; the particularity which constitutes us;
the baggage we inherit. While retaining a sense of tradition as from
the past, this reading of Gadamer breaks the link between tradition
and authority by undermining the claim of tradition to any special
access to truth. Thus Gadamer does not so much bolster tradition in its
engagement with reason as undermine the epistemological opposition
between the two. Or to put it another way, he joins the postmodern
refrain concerning the limits of possible knowledge.
III
A post-traditional order is not one in which tradition disappears – far from
it. It is one in which tradition changes its status. Traditions have to explain
themselves, to become open to interrogation or discourse.
Anthony Giddens
If this reading of Gadamer is right, if neither tradition nor reason is
epistemologically privileged, what does this mean for a world in
which the opposition between reason and tradition seems very much
alive? For anthropologists and sociologists the answer to this question
depends on whether one embraces a ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ reading of tra-
dition. The former refers to a broader sense of tradition as a ‘long-
established’ social practice therefore assigned normative value, the
latter to a narrower sense of tradition as involving a specific form of
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validation: ritual assertion by authority figures. Thus, whereas for the
former the opposition between reason and tradition is misleading as
all societies have their own long-established social practices, for the
latter tradition is associated with a historically specific form of insti-
tutional authority. On this view then, the traditional nature of a soci-
ety is open to empirical investigation. Importantly, although Gadamer
appears to have advanced the weaker sense of tradition, his account
is equally compatible with either view as his concern was epistemo-
logical not sociological.
An example of a ‘weak’ traditionalist is Edward Shils. Shils argues
that contemporary society retains a traditional aspect in that the suc-
cessful institutionalisation of reason relies on it becoming traditional,
that is, being accepted because it is ‘handed down from the past’. This
argument covers several key points: ‘traditionality’, as he terms it, is
not associated with any one substantive content. Further, although it
is ‘handed down from the past’ there is nothing which stipulates how
long it must be handed down – although he decides three generations
is a good rule of thumb. It can also be handed down in any form, oral
or written. Nevertheless, tradition is more than the statistically fre-
quent recurrence over generations of similar beliefs, practices and so
on, in that this recurrence is a consequence of the acceptance of the
tradition as ‘normative’. It is this normative transmission which is the
‘inertial force’ which holds society in a given form over time. Thus
the distinctive feature of tradition is that its truth claims are believed
because they ‘were believed previously’, and thus deserving of
‘faith’. It would be mistaken to term contemporary society ‘post-tra-
ditional’, Shils holds, because traditional justification is an integral
part of the glue which holds together all societies.
In contrast with Shils, Pascal Boyer argues that it is possible to
distinguish traditional from modern societies on the basis of the ‘tra-
ditional’ status of key institutions. From an examination of oral tradi-
tional practices in ‘pre-modern’ societies, Boyer argues that tradition
has less to do with cosmological beliefs than the redemption of causal
truth-claims about a state of affairs. The criteria for accepting such
claims depend both on who makes such claims (only certain people
are seen as truthful) and the correct rituals for making such claims.
For Boyer, traditional practices are thus forms of communication
which rely on belief in the authority of particular persons and social
practices. Whether one can term a society ‘traditional’ depends on the
extent of tradition practices to be found in a society. Thus, he notes,
while all societies seem to have some form of traditional behaviour
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(he cites Luhrmann’s monograph on London ‘witches’ as a contem-
porary example), in so-called traditional societies almost all the
‘salient, socially significant and memorable’ claims to truth are made
in the context of ‘traditional’ interaction (1990:113).
For a ‘strong’ reading of tradition incorporated in a developed
analysis of contemporary global society it is to Anthony Giddens we
must turn. Giddens sees tradition as playing a central role in pre-mod-
ern societies both in respect of its role in identity formation but, more
significantly for us, in its relation to authority. In respect of the for-
mer, Giddens argues that tradition is one of four ‘localised contexts of
trust’ which maintains ontological security in pre-modern societies.7
In respect of the latter, Giddens, like Boyer, sees tradition playing a
central role in structuring social activity in a relatively fixed social
landscape through ritualised affirmation of authority (1994:6). (It is
also important to appreciate the connection, via trust, between the
identity and institutional functions of tradition.)
Contemporary global society, Giddens continues, is ‘post-tradi-
tional’. This is not because tradition disappears but rather changes its
status. Tradition now exists alongside other forms of social practice
and hence becomes a choice – no longer simply the way things are
done. Further, and more importantly, due to the increasingly reflexive
nature of social institutions, tradition has now to explain itself: it has
to give reasons, become open to interrogation and discourse (1994:5).
The demise of tradition is thus directly linked to its purging from
institutional practice as modern society has become more reflexive:
post-fordist industry and political democracy are examples here.
‘Detraditionalisation’ is thus on the rise as all aspects of contem-
porary social life become colonised by reflexive social practice
(1994:6). This suggests that, like Boyer, Giddens sees ‘real tradition’
as involving more than long-established practice but also a particular
form of validation involving key institutions.
This stated, Giddens acknowledges that the influence of tradition
remains strong. This is partly because in the earlier phases of the
development of modern societies (which he terms ‘simple moderni-
sation’ and distinguishes from ‘complex modernisation’) a refocusing
or re-invention of tradition played a major role in consolidating the
social order. Nationalism is an obvious example, but no less impor-
tant were gender and sexual practices. Even science became a sort of
tradition in that its universal authority was unquestioningly accepted
for some time. Given the uneven nature of development globally it
seems reasonable to assume that some sectors would still be under-
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going mostly ‘simple’ rather than ‘reflexive’ modernisation, although
the impact of systems of instant communication (as well as different
historical conditions such as colonialism) will render this a different
process from the European experience. Lastly, but importantly, Gid-
dens argues that we can understand the recent rise of fundamentalism
as the defence of tradition in the traditional way – but in a context
where that mode of defence has been called into question. In a glob-
alising, culturally cosmopolitan, information technology-driven soci-
ety the ritual assertion of truth amounts to a refusal of dialogue which
runs against the evident plurality of choice, but more significantly, the
increasing reflexivity of social life (1994:6).
Thus Giddens joins Boyer against Shils in relating tradition to a
specific form of justification – the ritual assertion of its truth by
authority. Hence while all societies can be said to share some sort of
tradition insofar as this means a long established social practice there-
fore assigned normative value, not all societies operate in ‘tradition-
alist’ ways. That the ‘strong’ reading of tradition is more convincing
is suggested by the fact that in traditional societies, tradition did
change – although certainly not the kind of change contemporaries
are used to. What this suggests is that it’s not simply the persistence
of practice which lends tradition its meaning, but the particular mode
of its validation. ‘Traditionalism’ as David Apter puts it, or the tradi-
tionalist defence of tradition, is thus equally important and it is this
additional element which strong readings also incorporate (1968:115).
Conclusion
He has two antagonists: the first presses him from behind, from the ori-
gin. The second blocks the road ahead. He gives battle to both. To be
sure the first supports him in his fight with the second, for he wants to
push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his
fight with the first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically
so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there but he himself as
well, and who really knows his intentions. His dream though, is that in
an unguarded moment … he will jump out of the fighting line and be
promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, to the position of
umpire over his antagonists in this fight with each other.
Franz Kafka
The question of the rehabilitation of tradition in the context of the cur-
rent Stimmung has thus led to an ambiguous conclusion. On the one
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hand, Gadamer’s retrieval of tradition as the source of our prejudices
necessary to the hermeneutics of understanding undermines reason’s
exclusive claims to truth-redemption. Yet this does not aid the English
traditionalists Burke and Oakeshott as, on the other hand, Gadamer
simultaneously undermines tradition’s claims to primacy in truth-
redemption. Rather, he transcends the tradition-reason opposition,
incorporating both as partners in meaning-construction. Sociologi-
cally, tradition’s redemption is equally ambiguous. On the one hand,
tradition – understood in the weak sense of a long established practice
therefore assigned normative value – is affirmed as present in all soci-
eties, even the most developed. On the other, traditionalism – the
defence of tradition in the traditional way – is no longer the defining
feature of contemporary institutional practice. Understood in this
strong sense, tradition is connected with particular social forms of
authority which can be empirically measured. If Giddens is right, then
contemporary global society is increasingly a post-traditional one.
This ambiguity has significant consequences for the association of
tradition with ethnic and nationalist discourses. It sets up extreme
alternatives: on the one hand, in a context where tradition’s a priori
claim to truth is undermined and it is increasingly challenged to
explain itself, fundamentalism becomes a possibility. This can be seen
as a failure of the Gadamerian hermeneutical circle, where difference
leads not to mutual understanding but increasing hostility and vio-
lence. On the other hand, as traditionalism becomes increasingly seen
as outdated, there is the danger that the normative validation of the
past, and with it ethnic difference, becomes rejected altogether. Not
only an infringement of human rights,8 the long-term consequences of
this repression can be equally devastating. It seems then that ethnic-
ity and nationalism must appropriate tradition in a way which both
affirms it yet keeps it open to otherness – a tension not easily man-
aged but unavoidable in the ‘developing’African context.
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NOTES
1. The reply of a school student when asked ‘How important is the History of the
Zulu people to you?’. From a recent case-study of the ethnic identity and politi-
cal affiliation of Zulu-speaking school-children at a Pietermaritzburg school
(Wedekind et al. 1993).
2. In Imagined Communities he writes:
Because there is no Originator, the nation’s biography cannot be written
evangelically, ‘down time’, through a long procreative chain of begettings.
The only alternative is to fashion it ‘up time’ – towards Peking Man, Java
Man, King Arthur, wherever the lamp of archaeology casts its fitful gleam.
This fashioning, however, is marked by deaths, which, in a curious inversion
of conventional genealogy, starts from an original present. World War II
begets World War I; out of Sedan comes Austerlitz; the ancestor of the War-
saw Uprising is the state of Israel. (1991:205)
3. See John Lonsdale’s ‘The Moral Economy of the Mau Mau’, in B. Berman and
J. Lonsdale, 1992, pp.265-504.
4. The classic statement of this problem in South Africa was by Albert Luthuli:
We were thoroughly aware of the meeting of cultures, African and European,
and of the disorganisation of both … as a result. We do not have the desire of
the Nationalists that we should return to the primitive. But we did have an
intense wish to preserve what is valuable in our heritage while discarding the
inappropriate and outmoded … Our task seemed to consist of relating the
past coherently to the present and the future. (1962:35)
For fuller treatment of this dynamic see Shula Marks, The Ambiguities of Depen-
dence, 1986; and Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden, 1992.
5. A Heideggerian term, Stimmung refers to an amorphous, protean, and shifting
mood which nevertheless exerts a powerful influence on the ways in which we
think, act and experience (Bernstein 1991:11).
6. An example here is Gadamer’s claim against Habermas that the acceptance of
authority is not always a question of coercion or reflexive insight into the legit-
imacy of authority, but rather depends upon ‘dogmatic recognition’. This is the
realisation that as one can find no independent grounds for reflecting upon the
legitimacy or otherwise of authority, one has no basis to criticise ‘knowledge-
ably’, and thus that authority must have superior insight than oneself.
7. Important in this regard, is a distinct mode of structuring temporality which
Levi-Strauss terms ‘reversible time’. What this means is that tradition’s ‘orien-
tation to the past’ is not backward looking in the way a modern person with a lin-
ear conception of time would understand it. Neither the past nor future is a
discrete phenomenon separable from the present in the way we might believe.
An example here are the philosophers in pre-Ch’in China, who conceived of the
intersection of the past and present as a mobile relation, where history runs ‘lat-
erally’ rather than ‘backwards’ or ‘forwards’ (1984:201). As Giddens puts it,
‘past time is incorporated into present practices such that the horizon of the
future curves back to intersect with what went before’ (1990:105). Tradition
contributes to ontological security by sustaining trust in the continuity of past,
present and future, and connects such trust to routinised social practices
(1991:148).
8. See Taylor (1992).
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